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Abstract. In this paper I consider the normative arguments that justify
a public social security system as a redistributive device when government is
concerned with individual utility and poverty. Redistribution can be done using
social security, income taxation or both. The main objective of this paper is to
show how the consideration of a planner that cares about poverty and utility
increases the desirability of social security with respect to the case when the
planner only cares about utility.
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Resumen. En este art´ ıculo considero los argumentos que justiﬁcan el uso del
sistema de seguridad social como parte de un sistema para la redistribuci´ on.
Asumiendo que el gobierno se preocupa por la desigualdad del ingreso y por
la pobreza, estudio el dise˜ no del sistema de seguridad social conjuntamente
con el del impuesto sobre el ingreso laboral. El objetivo principal del art´ ıculo
es mostrar que la seguridad social adquiere mayor importancia como instru-
mento para la redistribuci´ on cuando el planiﬁcador se preocupa por la utilidad
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Palabras clave: bienestar, pobreza, impuestos a la renta, seguridad social.
Clasiﬁcaci´ on JEL: H21, H23, H51, H55.
*I am grateful to Helmuth Cremer, one anonymous referee and the editor of this journal.
Address for correspondence: Calle 14 No. 4-69. Bogot´ a, Colombia.
E-mail: dario.maldonadoca@urosario.edu.co
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogot´ a (Colombia) 9 (1): 39–59, junio de 200640 SOCIAL SECURITY, INCOME TAXATION AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION
1. Introduction
The problem of redistribution can be seen from three diﬀerent domains:
positive, normative, and political. From the positive domain the concern is to
provide potential explanations of inequality. From the normative domain one
looks for explanations about why redistribution should occur and which are
the best instruments for redistribution. Lastly, the political domain attempts
to understand how the decisions regarding redistribution are taken in a society.
This paper focuses on the normative domain of redistribution; naturally, the
positive domain must also be considered since it is needed as a framework to
study the reaction of workers to policies.
The positive domain is taken as given. Individuals are assumed to diﬀer in
wage and probability of getting sick, both of which aﬀect consumption. Since
I will assume that individuals’ welfare is fulﬁlled through consumption, het-
erogeneity generates inequalities that may justify government intervention. In-
dividuals with a low wage will have a low labor income and hence a lower
consumption level. Heterogeneity in the probability of sickness aﬀects welfare
since it also aﬀects consumption. If individuals are risk averse, and insur-
ance markets are complete, they will buy full insurance. This means high-risk
individuals (those with high probability of illness) will face a higher cost of
insurance and will have a lower consumption than low-risk individuals.
The setting in this paper is one in which the social planner has a plurality
of objectives. In economics, it is traditionally assumed that the central planner
determines the optimal allocations in a way that only considers the utility level
of the agents in the economy. Generally welfare is measured through some ag-
gregation of the utility of the population. This approach has been criticized for
being limited in terms of information; indeed, Atkinson (1995) and Sen (1999)
have argued that welfarism (as they call the traditional approach in Economics)
leaves aside information that may be important for policy making. In this pa-
per I will deal with the case in which the planner cares about individual utility
levels but also about the poverty level.
My objective in this paper is to examine under which conditions social in-
surance is a useful mechanism to alleviate poverty when the central planner
is not only concerned about income distribution but also about poverty. The
distinction between income distribution and poverty is important. Usually, the
introduction of concerns about income distribution is done respecting individu-
als’ own perception of wellbeing; this can be regarded as a subjective measure of
wellbeing. However, wellbeing may also have objective dimensions. The intro-
duction of poverty concerns aims at considering these alternative dimensions.
Since the economic literature recognizes taxation as a powerful instrument to
redistribute, attention is centered in what can be done by social security in
terms of redistribution (besides what it is already done by optimal taxation).
To the best of my knowledge, this problem has not been treated extensively
in the literature. Blomqvist and Horn (1984), Rochet (1991), Cremer and
Pestieau (1996) and Henriet and Rochet (1998) have looked for the justiﬁcation
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogot´ a (Colombia) 9 (1): 39–59, junio de 2006D. MALDONADO 41
of social security in an optimal taxation context. All these authors work on
welfarist grounds and in their works individuals diﬀer in two aspects: wage and
the probability of falling ill.
Earlier works dealing with problems of taxation in non-welfarist settings
include Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994) and Wayne (2001). The ﬁrst solve
the non-linear income taxation problem for a planner that is concerned only
about the poverty level. Wayne (2001) uses the approach suggested by Atkinson
(1995), in which the social planner is concerned about both types of objectives:
welfarist and non-welfarist. This is the approach followed in this paper.
I will proceed as follows: the second section establishes the framework for
the analysis of the normative problem; particular attention is given here to how
poverty is understood and why a central planner should care about it. The
third section provides a general discussion about redistributive policy based on
a general overview of the related literature. The fourth section works along
the lines of Cremer and Pestieau (1996) and Wayne (2001) to show that social
security is justiﬁed (in the presence of an optimal income taxation system) when
the planner has a plurality of objectives.. Two types of settings are established
for the social security system. In the ﬁrst one, social security is universally
provided by a planner who chooses the rate of coverage of the system that is
equal for all the population; in the second one the planner has the possibility
to oﬀer diﬀerent coverage to poor and non-poor. The ﬁfth section concludes.
2. Poverty and welfare issues
The standard approach in the economic literature is welfarist. According
to this approach, the central planner aims to maximize a welfare function that
depends upon individuals’ utility levels. Generally, social welfare is measured
through the Bergson-Samuelson welfare function that aggregates individual’s
utility functions into one measure of social welfare. This function is assumed
to satisfy non-paternalism, Paretian property and aversion to inequality. The
non-paternalism features of this function are introduced through the fact that
the function only takes into account utility levels, in particular no other in-
formation that may be important from the social planner’s viewpoint is taken
into account. The Paretian property states that if every individual prefers one
of two alternatives, the social planner should also prefer that alternative. This
is recognized by using social welfare functions that are increasing in all the
arguments. The aversion to inequality is introduced by using concave social
welfare functions, where the degree of concavity reﬂects the degree of aversion
to inequality.
The central planner is thus worried only with the perception that individ-
uals have about their own welfare. In a society consisting of I individuals, the
central planner’s objective function is of the type W(U1,U2,...,UI), where Ui
is the utility function of individual i. A particularly important social welfare
function that has been extensively used in the economic literature is the util-
itarian social welfare function, which is the sum of individual utilities. This
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last type of social welfare function serves to illustrate an important point. The
planner can be concerned about inequality of diﬀerent variables. If the planner
is utilitarian, it is not concerned with inequality of utility (or welfare) but it
may still be concerned with inequality of consumption if utility is concave.
Several criticisms can be made to this welfarist approach. Perhaps, the most
relevant here is that of Sen (1999) and Atkinson (1995). These authors say that
the welfarist approach has informational problems, as the concentration on
individual’s perception leaves aside information that may be relevant for policy
making. One example of the type of information that could be important for
policy decision-making and is not taken into account by the welfarist literature
is that of freedom. Another example, the one on which attention is concentrated
here, is the limitations of the welfarist case when the existence of poverty is
recognized.
Another criticism usually made to the welfarist approach is that it neglects
inequality in other dimensions or variables (Sen, 1980 and 1983). Well known
examples about the consequences of welfarism when individuals diﬀer in mar-
ginal utility of consumption illustrate this type of concerns. The welfarist
approach may end up justifying repugnant conclusions like justifying very un-
equal societies just because there is a group of individuals that has a higher
marginal utility of consumption. Regarding this line of critique, I must say that
viewing the problem as that of the correct information for social evaluation can
lead to clearer conclusions than regarding it as that of the right dimension for
the concern about inequality.
There are several arguments that provide a justiﬁcation of why a central
planner should worry about poverty. The two most important are those that
see poverty as a problem of subsistence as well as an externality over the society
as a whole. Seeing poverty as the lack of subsistence means is the most common
approach. The subsistence concept has to be understood in a wider sense than
the biological one. This is something that has been recognized for quite a long
time. Sen (1997), citing Adam Smith, introduces the linen shirt argument, that
states that the poor are not only those whose income is so low that they do
not have the means to survive, but also those who can not acquire other goods
seen by society as indispensable to actively take part of this society’s activities.
This argument calls for a planner that takes care of the consumption of the
poor independently on how they perceive their own welfare. The argument is
criticized as paternalistic since it includes in the measure of welfare, elements
that no one in the society cares about. Moreover, it can be said that the planner
is concerned about the consumption level of some members in the society even
if they ”feel well” with their consumption level. To defend the concern about
poverty, Sen (1999) argues that the causes of poverty may distort people’s
perception about their own welfare, and as a consequence a social planner
must indeed care about people whose conditions are very bad, even if they do
not feel they are so.
Another way to defend the concern about poverty is to understand it as an
externality to society as a whole. The externality concept refers to the idea
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that poverty can be seen as a public bad for society; society as a whole may
not want to see a group of people that cannot make active part of it because
they lack the economic means. Poverty can aﬀect society’s welfare in many
ways. One can start thinking simply that the non-poor may not be indiﬀerent
about the others’ consumption and so their own welfare maybe aﬀected by the
existence of a group whose income is so low they cannot make active part of
society. A second argument appears with the idea that poverty can increase
criminality, which aﬀects the non-poor. A third argument appears if one thinks
that poverty aﬀects the production possibilities of the society by lowering the
productivity of a portion of the working force. Poverty thus generates an
externality on the society’s welfare making it necessary for the planner to take
care about it.
A diﬀerent problem arises when one thinks on how a central planner must
take into account the problem of poverty. One possibility is to say that the
planner must only take care of that part of the society that is worse oﬀ, which
may be in line with the Rawlsian arguments commonly found in the economic
literature. As indicated in the introduction, the work of Kanbur, Keen and
Tuomala (1994) solves the optimal non-linear taxation problem when the so-
cial planner is concerned only about poverty alleviation. In any case, this
approach has the same problem as the welfarist literature as it also ignores
other information that may be important for policy making.
A more appealing possibility is to say that the planner should take into
account more than one objective, as suggested by Atkinson (1995). Atkinson
suggests two types of procedures to include this extra information in the policy
formulation problem: the ﬁrst one is a hierarchy of principles procedure, in
which some of the information is used as a restriction when trying to fulﬁll
another objective. In this case a minimum level of utility for all members
of society can be used as a restriction looking for the optimal policy in terms of
reducing poverty that gives the non-poor at least this minimum level of utility.
Doing a similar exercise but setting a minimum level of consumption for the
poor and maximizing the welfare of society such that this minimum level is
attained is another possibility.
The second procedure, the one which is used here, is called Higher Order
Maximand, and it trades oﬀ the several objectives that the planner may have. It
establishes a new objective function in which elements of the several objectives
are included. Wayne (1999) uses this approach and formulates an objective
function that is a weighted sum of society’s welfare in terms of its members’
utility, and a poverty measure that only depends on the consumption of the
poor. This procedure ﬁts any of the two ways to consider poverty mentioned
above.
Literature about poverty typically focuses on two problems: identiﬁcation
and aggregation. The ﬁrst one relates to ﬁnding a way to know who the poor
are in a society; one form of doing so is to establish a poverty line that clas-
siﬁes as poor all people whose income (or consumption) is below the poverty
line. Although there are diﬃculties involved in deﬁning the poverty line, this
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parameter is taken as given for the purposes of this paper.
The issue of aggregation, on the contrary, is a more important problem
since the results may depend on the poverty measure chosen. In general the
economic literature oﬀers an axiomatic approach to the deﬁnition of poverty
measures. After setting some requirements about poverty measures, the lit-
erature looks for an appropriate measure that satisﬁes them. In this paper
the general additive separable poverty measure proposed by Atkinson (1987)




, where G(Ci,Z) is an individual
poverty measure and E is the expectation operator. The function G depends
on individual consumption Ci, and on the poverty line Z. G(Ci,Z) is strictly
decreasing and strictly convex in Ci and equal to zero when Ci > Z; this means
that an individual with consumption above Z is not considered as poor and
that the severity of poverty decreases in consumption.
If we let U be the utility level, the central planner will have an objective




where γ is the weight that the planner gives
to poverty. A useful property of this formulation is that it includes as special
cases the pure welfarist (γ = 0) planner.
Until now only the problem of inadequacy of income related to poverty has
been considered. Although it is recognized that there are many other issues
related to poverty, one that is central for the present work is the problem
of vulnerability. Although there will be no reference to the dynamic issues
of poverty, the distinction between chronic poverty and transitory poverty, as
deﬁned in Morduch (1994), is useful to introduce the concept of vulnerability. A
person is classiﬁed as chronically poor if her consumption or income is always
below the poverty line. A person is transitorily poor if her consumption or
income is below the poverty line only because of the inﬂuence of some transitory
factor that aﬀects her earnings. These concepts suggest the idea that a person
can be poor not only because she has a low wage (and thus a low income) but
also because she is exposed to some risk with more intensity than the non-
poor. Thus, vulnerability is the idea that poor people can be more exposed
to risk than non-poor. The existence of vulnerability does not aﬀect the way
the concept of poverty is measured and used in this paper, since risk averse
individuals and complete insurance markets are assumed, but it does open the
spectrum of policy issues related to the alleviation of poverty.
3. Policy issues: general discussion and related literature
The preceding section was concerned with the question of why a central
planner should worry about poverty. This section and the following deal with
the issues of the appropriate instruments to redistribute. I start oﬀ by propos-
ing answers to the questions of how poverty can be alleviated and the economic
eﬀects of the poverty alleviation programs. In this section there is no use of
mathematical tools or formulations; this type of analysis is postponed to the
next section where these issues are formally treated.
The broad question that is dealt with here is how to redistribute. Two
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogot´ a (Colombia) 9 (1): 39–59, junio de 2006D. MALDONADO 45
diﬀerent issues can be distinguished in this question, both of which have been
treated separately in the economic literature and the diﬀerence between them
depends on the constraints that are recognized.
One of the issues answers the question of who the recipients of redistribution
must be. It depends on the type of inequality, the reasons for the existence of
this inequality, and on the budget available for poverty alleviation. The ques-
tion is particularly important when dealing with poverty issues, and consists in
determining the best way to spend an antipoverty budget in a way that poverty
is minimized.
Bourguignon and Fields (1990) look at whether the anti-poverty policy
should be spent in the less poor of the poor, in the poorer of the poor or
in both groups. Their answer depends on the way poverty is measured, the
optimal allocation can go from taking the entire budget to the poorest of the
poor to taking it all to the less poor of the poor, with the possibility of mixed
policy allocations.
A drawback of this type of analysis is that it does not take into account the
way the anti-poverty budget is ﬁnanced or the incentive problems generated
by redistribution. This calls for the second issue in the problem of how to
redistribute. This problem is considered by the optimal redistributive taxation
literature. Although in general this literature is not concerned with poverty but
just with income distribution, it does takes into account the incentive problems
generated by ﬁnancing the redistributive policies through taxation.
The literature on optimal redistributive taxation has recognized that the
way the government ﬁnances its budget may have eﬀects on the individuals’
consumption and labor supply (Stiglitz, 1987). In general these eﬀects are
undesirable; the government does not want to distort individuals’ decisions
(the Second Welfare Theorem of Economics). The incentives literature has
developed an intuitive way to see this problem. A social planner may face the
problem that agents may not be willing to correctly reveal information needed
to implement the desired policy. To gather this information the government
must give incentives to individuals; it must make individuals ﬁnd optimal to
reveal truthful information. This generates a need to depart from ﬁrst-best
allocations relying on second-best allocations.
As an intuitive statement of the problem, consider a two goods setting, labor
and consumption, in which individuals diﬀer in wage, and the social planner
is worried about distribution. The planner looks for the best combination of
consumption and labor among individuals. In doing so it can ﬁnd that high-
wage individuals may not be interested in revealing their true wage since this
could imply a higher labor supply than that of the individuals with lower wage,
but the diﬀerence in consumption may not be enough to compensate for this
diﬀerence in labor supply. Under this problem the social planner must set an
allocation in which high-wage individuals not only work more but also have
a higher consumption than low-wage individuals. The ﬁrst type of allocation
mentioned, that in which individuals have incentives to misrepresent their wage
is not implementable and is called the ﬁrst best allocation. The allocation
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where the incentives problem is solved is the second best allocation and involves
distortions in the balance between consumption and labor supply.
The incentive problem may be more or less complicated depending on the
instruments the social planner will use, on the problems the social planner is
concerned about, and on the type of heterogeneity between individuals. The in-
struments problem refers to whether the planner wants to discriminate among
individuals or not (Stiglitz, 1987). If the government wants to discriminate,
charging diﬀerent marginal tax rates and giving diﬀerent transfers the problem
is one of non-linear taxation. Otherwise, when all individuals face the same
marginal tax rate and receive the same cash-transfer, the problem is a linear tax
one. The incentives problem also depends on the objective of the government.
The problem is not the same when the planner is concerned about poverty
besides or instead of utility (Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala, 1994). The incentive
problem becomes more complex when individuals diﬀer in more than one char-
acteristic; for example when there is some risk and individuals diﬀer not only
in their wage but also in their probability of loss (Cremer and Pestieau, 1996).
These three issues are examined now.
The diﬀerence between linear and non linear taxation highlights the two
diﬀerent issues about incentives that have been mentioned. The ﬁrst is the ef-
fect on labor supply of redistributive policies. It is clear that changes in income
(endogenous or exogenous) change individuals’ optimal choices. Labor income
taxation changes eﬀective wage rates; depending on the magnitudes of income
and substitution eﬀects, this may result in an increase or in a reduction of labor
supply. If taxation has some redistributive purposes the government will give
an exogenous transfer to all individuals in the economy. This change in exoge-
nous income also has eﬀects on labor supply, if labor (leisure) is a normal good
the subsidy will generate a decrease in labor supply. These two eﬀects on labor
supply are recognized in this problem; the tax rate would be inversely propor-
tional to the compensated elasticity of labor supply (this is always negative
if labor aﬀects negatively the utility) since it generates reductions in compen-
sated labor supply. The eﬀect of the subsidy is recognized through the social
gain of an increase in exogenous income, the subsidy reduces this gain since
it aﬀects negatively labor supply and thus labor income. Generally it is said
that the lump-sum subsidy should be set as to equate its social marginal gain
to its social marginal cost. This type of problem presents no adverse selection
diﬃculties since the government is treating every agent equally.
The adverse selection problem appears when the government tries to dis-
criminate among individuals. In this case the optimal policy is to give every
agent a consumption quantity and ask from them a determinate amount of
work (in general increasing with wage). The problem arises because individu-
als would try to behave strategically. Since high-wage individuals could prefer
the allocations intended for low-wage individuals, they would try thus to mimic
low-wage individuals. To circumvent this incentive problem the social planner
must make sure that the utility of the second best optimal solution increases
with wage. The most relevant conclusions of this analysis are that under some
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conditions the marginal tax rate is non negative over all the range of the pop-
ulation, that the individual with the highest wage has a zero marginal tax rate
(if wage is bounded above) and that consumption is increasing with pre-tax
labor income (Stiglitz, 1987).
In the cases in which the social planner has additional or diﬀerent objec-
tives to maximizing social welfare the adverse selection problem can have other
dimensions. Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994), work on this incentive prob-
lem when the social planner is only concerned about poverty. The important
remark they make is that a perfectly targeted system that transfers money to
the poor (for example in the policies considered in Bourguignon and Fields,
1990) acts as a 100% marginal tax rate on the income of those who receive the
transfers. The problem posed by this high marginal tax rates is that the ones
that receive the transfer have less incentives to work implying lower resources
for the overall economy and higher costs of the alleviation programs. This case
shows the trade oﬀ that arises with redistributive taxation policies. On the
one hand taxation on labor income is a powerful mean to collect resources to
redistribute, but on the other hand taxation reduces labor supply and induces
strategic behavior.
Besides Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994), Atkinson (1995) and Wayne
(2001) have considered the redistributive taxation problem in a setting where
the planner has broader objectives that the traditional welfarist planner. Atkin-
son (1995) is concerned with a planner that besides the traditional welfarist
objective is worried about liberty. And Wayne (2001) considers a central plan-
ner who is concerned with the traditional utilitarian welfare measure and with
the alleviation of poverty. For my purposes only the two in which there is a
concern for poverty are relevant. The paper of Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala
(1994) can be seen as a special case of Wayne (2001). Moreover, this last one
establishes the framework used in this work.
In the previous section it was said that the objective function of the poverty-
concerned welfarist planner has been borrowed from Wayne (2001). In his pa-
per he solves the linear income taxation and the non-linear income taxation
problem. The main contribution of his solution to the linear income taxa-
tion problem is to show that when poverty is taken into account the planner
has a special interest in the poor’s labor supply response to the marginal in-
come taxation. Generally with a constant marginal income tax, the marginal
tax rate is inversely related to the elasticity of labor supply. In the case where
there is a concern for poverty this eﬀect is taken further giving special weight
to the poor’s labor supply elasticity.
Wayne’s (2001) main conclusion is that the marginal tax rate will be nega-
tive for the lowest income individuals. Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994) ﬁnd
that when the planner is concerned only with poverty the marginal tax rate
for the lowest income group must be negative. The result contrasts with the
conclusion, when the government is utilitarian and when the marginal tax rate
is always non-negative.
When individuals are allowed to diﬀer in more than one characteristic the
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incentive problem also changes, now the sign of the correlation and the size
of the magnitude of the diﬀerential in the characteristics are important, the
incentives to mimic other type of individual can be reversed. Cremer and
Pestieau (1996) show this happens in a setting in which individuals can be of
two types and they can diﬀer in wage and in the probability of falling ill.
Cremer and Pestieau (1996) highlight two possible cases and in each two
sub-cases: a negative and a positive correlation between wage and risk and
in each of them the risk diﬀerential can be large or small with respect to the
wage diﬀerential. The important fact is that depending on this diﬀerential it
is possible to ﬁnd that in a setting where there is no government intervention
the relation between income and consumption may diﬀer. In the standard case
in the optimal non-linear taxation literature (Stiglitz, 1987), the high-wage in-
dividual has a higher income and higher consumption under no government
intervention. When individuals diﬀer in more than one parameter this relation
between income and consumption does not necessarily hold any more.
Diﬀerent cases are found when the risk diﬀerential is high relative to the
wage diﬀerential. If wage and risk are negatively correlated consumption is
higher for high-wage individuals but labor income is lower. And if both para-
meters are positively correlated the opposite case is found -high-wage individ-
uals have higher labor income but lower consumption. The important eﬀect
that operates here is the income eﬀect of risk associated to the expenditure
on insurance. In these cases this eﬀect is so big that the standard relations
are reversed. Since this paper introduces social security as a redistributive
instrument more will be said about it later.
The main question is how, if in some way at all, social security can foster
redistribution over what is done by an optimal taxation system. The literature
about the problem is not very extensive, four papers have been found that
work the problem: Blomqvist and Horn (1984), Rochet (1991), Cremer and
Pestieau (1996) and Henriet and Rochet (1998). The conclusion of the four
papers is essentially the same even though the models analyzed have impor-
tant diﬀerences: social security is justiﬁed as a redistributive instrument when
the probability of illness is negatively correlated with wage even if insurance
markets are complete. When it is assumed, as in Henriet and Rochet (1998),
that public provision of social insurance is less eﬃcient than private provision,
there is still a need for a negative statistical correlation, but it must be low
enough. The size necessary to have full social insurance depends on the rel-
ative ineﬃciency of public provision and on the average probability of loss of
the society.
The results of these papers also depend on the institutional features of
the social security system and particularly in how social security is ﬁnanced.
In the setting of Blomqvist and Horn (1984) and that of Rochet (1991) the
government ﬁnances social security and the lump-sum transfer through the
contributions of individuals, there is no independent prime associated to the
social security system. As it was already said, Blomqvist and Horn (1984)
use a constant marginal tax rate. Rochet (1991), in the non-linear taxation
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problem, uses a personalized tax that depends on individual’s labor income
and on the social insurance coverage chosen by each individual. In Cremer
and Pestieau (1996) the social security system is ﬁnanced through a lump-
sum tax proportional to the average probability of illness. The important fact
is that in all these settings the systems diﬀer from the private provision of
insurance in that individuals are not contributing according to their speciﬁc
probability of illness, and this is what permits redistribution through social
insurance.
An important result for the problem of redistribution states that when in-
dividual preferences are weakly separable in consumption and leisure all redis-
tribution should be done using optimal income taxation (Atkinson and Stiglitz,
1976). As stated by Rochet (1991) this result does not apply when individuals
diﬀer in their initial endowments. The diﬀerence between individuals risk acts
as diﬀerences in initial endowments, as is clearly showed by the diﬀerent pos-
sible cases of correlation and magnitude of the diﬀerentials in risk and wage
in Cremer and Pestieau (1996), opening the possibility of the social planner to
use social insurance as a redistributive mechanism.
To conclude this section, some remarks about the possibility of using social
insurance to alleviate poverty must be made. The idea that social insurance
can be useful for this purpose is related to the concept of vulnerability of the
poor mentioned at the end of the previous section. If the poor have a risk higher
than the non-poor, then a compulsory social insurance system where individual
payments are not related to their own risk may be useful. The social insurance
system that is ﬁnanced through a constant prime to all individuals, through
taxes on labor income or through personalized taxes that do not depend on
the individual’s risk, may alleviate poverty since the way the contributions
to the system are organized can be done in a way that poor are better under
this system than under private insurance. In a more general setting, in which
insurance markets are not complete, or the poor do not insure completely, the
usefulness of a social security system may be greater, since the poor will be
more vulnerable.
4. The model
The economy is populated by I types of individuals indexed by i ∈ [1,I],
diﬀering in wage, wi, and their probability of falling sick, pi. All individuals
have the same concave utility function, U, that depends on consumption, Ci,
and labor, Li. Individuals also face the same loss D when ill. The economy
has a fair private insurance market in which the individual can buy insurance
to cover for a proportion βi of her loss at a rate piβiD. The number of type i
individuals is represented by ni.
Under no government intervention each individual chooses C, L, and β to
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i − piβiD − D + βiD
for i ∈ {1,2},
where l and n represent the loss and no-loss situations, respectively. Individuals
pay piβiD for being insured against illness, if they suﬀer the loss from illness
they receive βiD from the insurance company. Individuals maximize the ex-
pected value of utility subject to the resource constraints in each state of the
world. Since U is increasing and strictly concave each individual chooses full
insurance, i. e., βi
∗ = 1. This implies that consumption and labor supply are




i . Let Ci(wi,pi)
and Li(wi,pi) represent optimal consumption and labor supply and V (wi,pi)
the indirect utility function. The budget constraint implies
Ci(wi,pi) = wiLi(wi,pi) − piD.
Note that piD takes the form of an exogenous income. The probability of
risk can be negatively or positively correlated to wage. If wage and risk are
negatively correlated, consumption and wage are positively correlated. Oth-
erwise, consumption and wage may be positively correlated if D is large, or
negatively correlated if D is small. In this last case risk is the most important
factor of inequality.
These relations are important when dealing with poverty. In this setting the
poor individual is not necessarily the individual with a low wage; it is possible
to ﬁnd a situation where high-wage individuals are poor if they also face higher
risk.
5. The optimal social security system
In this section, I will study the optimal redistributive social security system
when individuals behave as hypothesized in section 4 and the government’s
objective mixes welfarist and poverty concerns as introduced in section 2.
5.1. Universal coverage
There are two instruments government can use for redistribution: taxation
and social security. I will assume that government charges a constant marginal
tax rate, t, on each individual’s labor income, to ﬁnance a lump-sum subsidy,
T, and the social security system. The social security system is represented by
α, which is the coverage rate of the social security system. Since individuals are
risk averse and choose to have full insurance they will choose βi
∗ = 1 − α. In
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this case optimal choices of the individual are represented by Ci(wi,pi;α,t,T)
and Li(wi,pi;α,t,T) satisfying
Ci(wi,pi;α,t,T) = (1 − t)wiLi(wi,pi;α,t,T) − pi(1 − α)D + T.
The indirect utility function can now be represented by V (wi,pi;α,t,T);
Γ(wi,pi;α,t,T,Z) represents the individual indirect poverty measure.1 Note
that Γ is increasing in t and decreasing in T and α.
There are several ways in which the central planner can ﬁnance the social
security system. Among them, charging a constant prime rate to every member
in the society or using the funds collected from labor income taxation. Cremer
and Pestieau (1996) work under the ﬁrst scheme and in this section, I am
working under the second one. The reason for this choice is that in the analysis
of the model when there is targeting the usefulness of social security under the
ﬁrst scheme is limited. The results in this section do not depend on this election;
as it will be seen later, the results in Cremer and Pestieau (1996) are similar
to those presented in this section.










where, as before, E is the expectations operator. The ﬁrst term of the objective
function is the traditional utilitarian welfare function; it is exactly equal to the
sum of the utility function of individuals with every individual given the same
weight. The second part accounts for the government’s concern about poverty.
It is the sum of the individual poverty measure deﬁned above. γ reﬂects the
weight the planner gives to poverty.
It is important to remark that in this setting in which individuals diﬀer
in wage and risk not necessarily the low-wage individuals are the poor. If
high-wage individuals face high risk; and is large, they can be the poor.











twiLi − T − piαD
￿
≥ 0
α ∈ [0,1], t ∈ [0,1]
for i ∈ {1,2}.
The ﬁrst restriction that appears in the problem is the traditional resource
constraint; the second simply says that the social security coverage and the tax
rate must be positive and less than 100%. Let Ω represent the Lagrangean of
1This means that Γ(wi,pi;α,t,T,Z) = G(Ci(wi,pi),Z).
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as the social gain from a unit increase in an individual exogenous income in
terms of public funds. The ﬁrst part of the right hand side in this equation
is the social gain generated by the increase in consumption (or post-tax in-
come) due to an increase in exogenous income of individual i. The second part
corresponds to the gain due to an increase in consumption of the poor. The
third part corresponds to the loss generated by the reduction in labor income
of individual i due to her change in labor supply. Intuitively, Θi is larger for
poorer individuals. If the poor are the ones with high wage and D is large, Θi
will be larger for individuals with high wage than for those with low wage.
Using the deﬁnition of Θi
∂Ω
∂T





As it is standard in the optimal taxation literature, the basic income must
be set such that the average social cost of an additional unit of transfer, which
is one, must be equal to the social average gain of that additional unit.
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and the Slutsky decomposition
∂Li
∂t
= −wiSi − wiLi
∂Li
∂T
where Si is the derivative of the compensated labor supply with respect to the
wage rate. The resulting condition is
∂Ω
∂t














where ηlli is the compensated elasticity of labor supply.
Note that it is possible to have a zero marginal tax rate on income. This hap-
pens if Cov(wiLi,Θi) > 0, which is the case when wage and risk are positively
correlated and D is large. In this case high-wage individuals have lower con-
sumption than low-wage individuals and thus the high-wage individuals are the
poor ones. The ﬁrst message of this paper is this one: when Cov(xiLi,Θi) > 0
and D is large all redistribution is done using the social security system; in-
come taxes should not be used to redistribute if the poor are the high-wage
but high-risk individuals.
In the case where Cov(xiLi,Θi) < 0 an interior solution for t is likely. The


















The condition is very similar to that shown by Wayne (2001), and has the
standard interpretation in terms of the equity-eﬃciency trade oﬀ related to
changes in t. If labor is normal, an increase in the marginal tax rate decreases
labor supply but it allows a higher basic income which increases utility and
reduces poverty. The denominator of the expression gives the dead weight loss
of an increase in the marginal tax rate, it is the eﬃciency eﬀect, the higher the
own price elasticity of labor supply the lower is t. The numerator is composed of
two elements. The ﬁrst term is the covariance which gives the gain in terms of
redistribution; the higher the covariance (in absolute terms) the higher the
beneﬁts of redistribution. The second term introduces the concern for poverty.
Notice that ∂Gi/∂Ci = 0 if individual i is non-poor and ∂Gi/∂Ci < 0 if i is
poor; since the whole expected value is negative it implies that the higher the
elasticity of labor supply of the poor the lower the marginal tax rate. If the poor
have a low labor supply elasticity, a high marginal tax rate won’t aﬀect too
much their labor supply calling for a high t that increases redistribution. The
diﬀerence with the condition found by Wayne (2001) is that now it is possible
to have a zero marginal tax rate when age and risk are positively related.
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We should now consider three cases:
a) Cov(pi,Θi) < 0 always,
b) Cov(pi,Θi) > 0 always and
c) Cov(pi,Θi) = 0 for some α = 0.
In the ﬁrst two cases there are corner solutions: either no social security (α = 0)
which happens when the covariance is negative, or social security crowds out
completely the private market for insurance α = 1 which happens when the
covariance is positive. When the covariance can take a zero value a social
security with partial coverage is possible.
Corner solutions: recall that Θi is higher for individuals with low consump-
tion. A positive covariance between risk and Θi is found when low-wage in-
dividuals have high risk or when high-wage individuals have high risk and D
is large. In the ﬁrst case low-wage individuals will be the poor, and the mar-
ginal tax rate will be strictly positive. Consequently redistribution is done with
cash transfers and social security. In the second case high-wage individuals are
the poor, the marginal tax rate will be zero and the lump-sum transfer will
be negative, as it is the only source to ﬁnance social security. In this case
all redistribution is done through the social security system; it is particularly
important to note that monetary transfers are not used to redistribute. The
interpretation of this condition is very similar to the one given by Cremer and
Pestieau (1996) and by Rochet (1991) in welfarist frameworks.
When the covariance between risk and Θi is negative, social insurance
should not be used for redistribution. All redistribution should be done with
the taxation system.
Interior solutions: now consider the case in which there can be an interior
solution for the rate of coverage of the social security system. This happens
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when, for α = 0, Cov(pi,Θi) > 0 and the beneﬁts of increasing α are exhausted
for some α < 1. This is the case when wage and risk are positively related;
low-wage individuals are those facing lower risk. If D is big enough, high-wage
individuals will be those with a lower consumption. Now suppose that we start
increasing α from α = 0; this will reduce inequality. This reduction may be
such that at some point the high-risk high-wage individuals stop being those
with lower consumption. There will be an interior solution for α if at some
point Cov(pi,Θi) = 0.
The most important question that must be answered here is whether the
introduction of poverty concerns changes the social security coverage rate. A





















corresponds to the traditional welfarist value of income in terms of public funds.






In the cases where there are corner solutions for the social security coverage
rate, it turns out that there is no diﬀerence between the solution of the welfarist
planner and the poverty concerned planner. It is easy to check that in the
cases in which Cov(pi,Θi) is always strictly positive or negative the sign of





When interior solutions for α are possible, things are diﬀerent. Recall that
interior solutions are possible when risk is the most important factor of hetero-
geneity (pi and wi positively related and D large). In such a case necessarily








Cov(pi,Θi) > 0,2 meaning that the introduction of poverty concerns induces a
larger social security coverage rate.
5.2. Targeting
An important problem in income sustenance programs is targeting. The
planner can design two types of security systems: universal or means-tested.
Means-tested transfers have the advantage of reducing the planner’s budget and
thus reducing the burden of taxation. Universal systems (as those discussed
in section 5.1) have the advantage of not requiring too much information and
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thus it implies low costs of administration. Pareto optimality of a means-tested
system is now investigated.
To analyze this case I will turn to a simpler setting where there are only
two types of individuals.3 Now i ∈ {1,2} and w1 < w2. To have an interesting
case I suppose that at least one type is considered poor by the government
(that with the lowest consumption). Now incentive constraints may be impor-
tant. Since the coverage level may be diﬀerent, individuals may be tempted
to mimic the other type of individual to receive the beneﬁts of a higher so-
cial security coverage rate. The social security system must now satisfy the
additional constraint
V (wi,pi;T,t,αi) ≥ V (wi,pi;T,t,αj)
which simply says that any individual must ﬁnd in her best interest to reveal
her true type. An individual may be tempted not to do so if the coverage rate
of the social security system oﬀered to the other type is high enough.


























for i,j ∈ {1,2}, i  = j.
The problem of the planner in this section is very similar to that in sec-
tion 4.2. Besides the possibility of having diﬀerential coverage rates in social
security the planner faces the incentive compatibility constraint. As before let
Ω be the Lagrangean of this problem. The ﬁrst order conditions for t and T














































where µij and Vij are the Lagrange multipliers of the incentive constraints and
the indirect utility functions of individual i mimicking individual j. Both incen-
tive constraints will not be binding at the same time. Recalling the four cases
3This is not a very restrictive assumption. In a case with more than two types as that
considered in section 4.1 the results would be the same as long as the assumption of only two
social security coverage rates is kept, one for the poor and one for the non-poor.
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highlighted by Cremer and Pestieau (1996), it can be said that the incentive
constraint avoiding type 1 individuals to mimic type 2 individuals will be bind-
ing (µ12 > 0) when type 1 is the poor, and the other constraint will be binding
(µ21 > 0) when type 2 individual is the poor. It can be the case that both
constraints are not binding (µ12 = 0 and µ21 = 0).
Using the same relations as for the universal provision case, the conditions
may be simpliﬁed as follows
∂Ω
∂α1
















Again, interior and corner solutions are possible. First suppose none of the
incentive constraints is binding. If increasing α from zero does not equalize
Θ1 and Θ2 full social insurance for the poor and no social insurance for the




= 1 then if individual 1 is the
poor Θ1 > 1 and Θ2 < 0, µ12 = 0 and µ21 = 0, then:
∂Ω
∂α1




= n2Dλ(Θ2 − 1) < 0.
If individual 2 is poor the inverse situation is found since Θ1 < 1 and Θ2 > 1.
If increasing α does make Θ1 and Θ2 equalize we would ﬁnd a zero coverage
rate for the non-poor and a coverage rate for the poor which is less than 100%.
When one of the constraints is binding it is possible to have an interior
solution in which there is partial coverage for at least one of the groups. For
example in the case when individual 2 is the poor, the binding constraint will
be that avoiding individual 1 to mimic individual 2, then µ12 > 0 and µ21 = 0.
In this case the ﬁrst order conditions are
∂Ω
∂α1










Both conditions can be positive, negative or zero implying that possibly the
optimal coverage rate will be diﬀerent from zero and from one. Since a non-
zero coverage insurance rate increases the burden of taxation, when one of the
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constraints is binding, the coverage rate for the non-poor will be zero and the
coverage rate of the poor will be strictly positive but not necessarily equal to
100%.
The result thus says that independent of the relation between the probabil-
ity of falling sick and wage, targeting is optimal when the incentive constraints
are not binding. If one of the incentives constraints is binding, an interior solu-
tion can be found in which there is possibly a partial insurance for at least one
of the groups. To interpret the results note that having a binding constraint
means that the government faces costs when it tries to elicit information from
workers. These costs will cause the social security coverage rate of the targeted
group to be smaller than 100%.
The introduction of poverty concerns generates an interesting case with
respect to the situation where the planner is pure welfarist. Suppose that
for the optimal t and T, e Θ1 = e Θ2 for α1 = α2 = 0. In this case the ﬁrst
order conditions for α1 and α2 are satisﬁed and it is not optimal to have social
security if the planner is pure welfarist. The introduction of poverty concerns
is this case will make social security useful since for the poor e Θi < Θi while
for the non-poor e Θi = Θi. Concerns about poverty make the presence of social
security a useful instrument for redistribution.
6. Conclusion
This paper has discussed the ideas related to the possibility of justifying
a social insurance system as a redistributive tool. The introduction of social
security depends on the existence of some risk; in this case it was assumed the
existence of an idiosyncratic risk, best understood as the possibility of falling
ill, and on the contribution of this risk to inequality. This paper was concerned
with the possibility of using social security simultaneously with an optimal
redistributive income tax system.
When the social security system must be provided universally the positive
correlation between the probability of illness and the social marginal valuation
of income justiﬁes the existence of a compulsory social security system. This
happens when wage and risk are negatively correlated and when wage and risk
are positively correlated and the possible loss is big. When the government
can target social security to the poor the existence of social security is always
justiﬁed. The main contribution of this paper is to show that concerns about
poverty may aﬀect the optimal social security coverage rate. If risk is the most
important factor of inequality social security will be more generous when the
planner is concerned with poverty and utility than when it is only concerned
with utility.
These results have a lack of realism, several widely recognized problems
of private insurance markets and social security systems are not taken into
account. The most important of them is the moral hazard problem; in general
moral hazard calls for the inappropriateness of full insurance since with full
insurance agent’s probability of loss can be greater. The existence of moral
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogot´ a (Colombia) 9 (1): 39–59, junio de 2006D. MALDONADO 59
hazard can weaken these results.
On the other hand it has been assumed that the private insurance market
is complete, the most important assumption is that poor and non-poor have
access to insurance markets. This is not true in general, but the existence
of this type of problems reaﬃrms the conclusions obtained since, even in this
idealized framework, full social insurance is justiﬁed.
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